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Introduction The state sought to resolve collective action problems by enforcing binding contracts in the form of legal penalties (fines, incarceration), social sanctions (ostracism), social rewards (status and respect), or economic prizes (transfers, assets, or private goods) (Taylor, 1987). According to this line of argumentation, public goods such as a public transportation infrastructure cannot be provided in optimal amounts through a market, due to the fact that free riders will not pay their share of the costs; only authoritative structures and processes make it possible for costs to be ef- ficiently recouped from the users of public goods (Olson, 1965). Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous section, a state solution is not always necessary, possible, or successful in any case. Since the 1980s, most economic and political processes have involved either a mix of market and hier- archy, or goods having mixed public and private and globalization (Crotty, 2009; Robinson, 2001; Sassen, 2000). In this new context, the logic of collective action is becoming more heterogeneous and multilayered, derived not from a single core structure such as the state, but from networked interdependencies across global markets (Cerny, 1995; also see Castells, 2010, chapter 5). These networked interdependencies have reconfigured the traditional bureaucratic organization of collec- tive action to a blended action model based on a network of communities of practice that draw on expert as well as local, experience-based knowl- edge (Snyder & Briggs, 2003; Ostrom, 1999). This network of communities of practice is found to engage in cross-sector, inter-organizational cooperation around common problems, such as how to advance "green," environment-friendly technology (Laws et al., 2001). This shift in the logic of collective action is