42 CHAPTER 2 Playing with Equilibria in Wireless Non-Cooperative Games structure of the game. This approach is close in spirit to the mass-action interpretation made by Nash in his thesis where he mentioned: "It is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes." But the participants are supposed to accumulate empirical information on the rela- tive advantages of the various pure strategies at their disposal. To be more precise, we assume a population (in the sense of statistics) of participants for each position of the game. Let us also assume that an "average play" of the game involves n participants selected at random from the population, and that there is a stable average frequency with which each pure strategy is employed by the average member of the population. Since there is no collaboration between individuals playing in different positions of the game, the probability that a particular n-tuple of pure strategies will be used in a play should be the product of the probabilities of each of the players. [...] Thus the assumption we made in this mass-action interpretation leads to the conclusion that the mixed strategies representing the average behavior in each of the popula- tions form an equilibrium point. The considerable development of learning theory in