CHAPTER 2 Game Theory for Infrastructure Security: The Power of Intent-Based Adversary Models 37 perspective of the attackers) and its impact on the intrusion detection against insider attacks. We consider the interactions between the defender and (numerous) attackers as a repeated game. The basic idea is for the defender to carefully choose his or her strategy in the begin- ning to establish a desired reputation of tough- ness (i.e., willingness to detect and punish attack- ers even with high cost of false alarms), which may force the upcoming attackers to drop their attacks, and lead to lower cost in the long run. A typical real-world example of this strategy is the police surge against criminal activities aimed at intimidating potential criminals and reducing crimes further. The theoretical foundations of this strategy, especially the role of reputation in repeated games have been studied in the litera- ture of game theory [3, 23]. it is unclear how to counteract entry-exit linking attacks with the presence of a smart adversary that strategically deploys a set of malicious Tor nodes into the system. Thus, we present the first game-theoretic study on the design of path selec- tion algorithm against entry-exit linking attacks introduced as above. Our goal is to provide a set of principles for the design of path selection algorithms. 2.3. INTENT-BASED ADVERSARY MODEL FOR ANOMALY DETECTION In this section, we first describe participating par- ties in anomaly detection, and then describe their strategies and objectives in an intent-based view. After that, we formulate in game theory to model the interaction between defenders and attackers. We finally propose two novel algorithms for rep-