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28 Security and Robustness in the Intern... > 28.8 Conclusions and Future Challeng... - Pg. 729

CHAPTER 28 Security and Robustness in the Internet Infrastructure will be no record of the update on the real MS side and malicious updates can be easily detected. Attacks trying to defeat the protection by overriding the address of the reference node or bypassing the check can also be detected. When the TTL expires and a verification is invoked, the reference node cannot receive hash values from non-reference nodes, and as discussed above, the links binding reference nodes and the local MS can hardly be compromised. In addition, legiti- mate and malicious modifications to the configu- ration data can be distinguished by the channels. Modifications using the secure update via local MS are considered legitimate, and all other mod- ifications can be treated as malicious. In the above, we assumed ­ for simplicity ­ that all configuration data is identical for mem- bers of the set. In practice, each node will always have some unique data as discussed above. Any updates to such data must be authenticated, 729 fundamental functions of name resolution, rout- ing, and switching. We discussed some protocols such as IPsec and SSL for ensuring secure transfer of information. Finally, we discussed the issue of robustness and security of configuration manage- ment since many of the challenges in maintaining robustness can be attributed to protocol and con- figuration complexities. It is a well-accepted fact that the original design of Internet protocols did not consider security issues at all, and security was added later in a rather haphazard manner. Although many of the well-known Internet protocols have been either standardized or floated as a draft standard, only a small fraction of them have either come into widespread use (e.g., SSL) or have received enough traction (e.g., DNSSEC, IPsec). Often the problem is the embedded base of unsecured protocols and the overhead of imple- menting secure versions. As mentioned, many